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Introduction
Consider the following utterance from a pro-
fessor in statistics: 
(1) Some students dislike statistics. 
Most people interpret some students as not all 
students (i.e., the pragmatic interpretation), 
though logically it means some and possibly 
all students. This tendency finds its roots in 
the assumption that people make their con-
tribution to a conversation as informative as 
possible (Grice, 1975). The rationale is that 
the professor would have used a stronger, 
more informative term if he knew that all of 
his students disliked statistics, thus some is 
interpreted as not all. This scalar inference, as 
it is called, has been studied extensively and 
different theories have been developed to 
explain the underlying processes (see Noveck 
& Reboul, 2008, for an overview). In particu-
lar, the contradiction between two popular 
views on scalar inferences, default theories 
and contextual accounts, is what fuelled 
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The present study investigated people’s understanding of underinformative sen-
tences like ‘Some oaks are trees’. Specifically, the scalar term ‘some’ can be inter-
preted pragmatically, Not all oaks are trees, or logically, some and possibly all oaks 
are trees. The aim of this study was to capture the interindividual variability in 
the interpretation of such sentences. In two experiments, participants provided 
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results showed that only participants’ response times to the underinformative 
sentences could predict class membership. Specifically, the slower participants 
responded, the more likely they were to interpret underinformative sentences con-
sistently pragmatic or inconsistent instead of consistently logical.
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much research on this topic. Default theories 
assume that scalar inferences arise automati-
cally without much cognitive effort. A prag-
matic understanding of some is the default 
interpretation, but it may be cancelled in 
certain contexts (Chierchia, 2004; Levinson, 
2000). Contextual accounts like relevance 
theory on the other hand posit that the 
pragmatic interpretation requires processing 
time, hence it is only endorsed when it yields 
sufficient positive cognitive effects (Sperber 
& Wilson, 1986, 1995). 
Of particular interest are underinformative 
utterances like:
(2) Some oaks are trees.
A pragmatic understanding of (2) implies 
that the sentence is false, since all oaks are in 
fact trees. On the other hand, the sentence is 
true when one holds a logical interpretation 
(i.e., some and possibly all oaks are trees). 
The double truth value of underinforma-
tive sentences has been exploited in several 
experimental studies to pit default theories 
against contextual accounts. Seminal work 
from Bott and Noveck (2004) showed that 
participants in a sentence verification task 
are slower when they endorse the pragmatic 
interpretation (i.e., judging a sentence like 
(2) as false) than when they endorse the 
logical interpretation (i.e., judging (2) as 
true). Building on this study, Bott, Bailey, 
and Grodner (2012) reported experiments 
suggesting that the scalar inference itself is 
cognitively costly, thereby ruling out that the 
effects observed by Bott and Noveck were 
purely the result of verification processes. 
These results, together with the observation 
that scalar inferences are context depend-
ent (e.g., Bonnefon, Feeney, & Villejoubert, 
2009), provide evidence against a default 
account of scalar implicatures. 
Since the findings from Bott and Noveck 
(2004), several new accounts (or modifica-
tions of older ones) have been proposed 
(Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013; Chiercia, 
Fox, & Spector, 2008; Degen & Tanenhaus, 
2011, 2014; Huang & Snedeker, 2009). Of 
particular interest to the present paper are 
the one-step and two-step models. Two-step 
models assume that the literal meaning of 
some is derived first after which the enriched 
not all inference is drawn (Huang & Snedeker, 
2009; Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013). In a 
way, a two-step model can be viewed as the 
mirror-image of a default theory. Where the 
latter posits that the not all interpretation is 
the default that can be overruled, two-step 
models consider the literal interpretation to 
be default, which serves as a stepping stone 
to derive the scalar inference. In contrast, the 
constraint-based one-step model (Degen & 
Tanenhaus, 2011; 2014) rejects the notion 
that the literal interpretation is somehow 
privileged. Instead, it postulates that the 
appropriateness of a certain interpretation 
is assessed by integrating multiple contex-
tual cues. The outcome of this process then 
determines whether or not the scalar infer-
ence will be derived. 
Despite the general tendency to inter-
pret some as not all, theories are largely 
silent when it comes to interindividual 
differences. That is, research shows that 
people vary in how they interpret underin-
formative utterances (for an overview see 
Dieussaert, Verkerk, Gillard, & Schaeken, 
2011). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
people differ considerably in the consistency 
with which they interpret underinformative 
sentences. That is to say, some people inter-
pret such sentences with great consistency, 
while others often switch between a prag-
matic and a logical interpretation. The aim of 
the present study was to uncover such indi-
vidual differences using latent class analysis 
(McCutcheon, 1987). 
Latent class analysis is a statistical tech-
nique to classify observations into a number 
of categories. It is based on the premise that 
a number of observed variables (e.g., several 
medical symptoms like fever, a cough,…) 
covary because of their relation with an 
unobserved underlying variable (e.g., a dis-
ease like the flu). With respect to scalar 
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implicatures, we asked participants to evalu-
ate the truth value of 20 underinformative 
sentences like (2). The responses of partici-
pants (i.e., true or false) to the different items 
are the manifest variables for the latent class 
analysis. The rationale of the analysis is that 
one latent variable, which we will call inter-
pretation mode, underlies the 20 covary-
ing response vectors. Interpretation mode 
here indicates the way in which participants 
understand underinformative sentences. 
Based on previous studies one could discern 
at least two modes: a “logical mode” and a 
“pragmatic mode”. That is to say, some partic-
ipants exhibit a clear preference for a logical 
interpretation of the scalar term some (i.e., 
the logical mode) whereas others endorse 
a pragmatic interpretation (i.e., the prag-
matic mode). So when performing a latent 
class analysis, one would expect a solution 
that comprises at least two latent classes. In 
addition, Dieussaert and colleagues (2011) 
claim that there are actually three groups: 
consistently logical participants, consist-
ently pragmatic participants and inconsist-
ent participants. The latter are those who 
(often) switch between a logical and a prag-
matic interpretation. However, the bound-
ary between consistent and inconsistent 
is rather vague. Dieussaert and colleagues 
(2011) classified participants as inconsistent 
if their modal answer was given in less than 
90% of the trials. One advantage of latent 
class analysis is that it obviates the need to 
use such relatively arbitrary criteria to clas-
sify participants into categories. It estimates 
the exact number of latent classes using 
model selection measures. In this way, one 
can evaluate whether there is evidence for a 
third class (i.e., the inconsistent participants) 
or even for four classes. Moreover, latent 
class analysis allows for uncertainty in the 
classification of participants, such that cat-
egorization is not an all or none matter.
So the first goal of the study was to capture 
interindividual differences in the way people 
interpret scalar implicatures. A second goal 
was to examine whether we could predict 
these differences. Previous research using 
underinformative sentences has shown that 
a pragmatic interpretation requires more 
processing time than a logical interpreta-
tion (Bott et al., 2012; Bott & Noveck, 2004; 
Tomlinson et al., 2013). Based on these 
findings we investigated in Experiment 1 
whether participants’ response times were 
related to their class membership, such that 
slow participants were more likely to be 
categorized as pragmatic participants than 
as being logical. Secondly, we manipulated 
the font in which sentences were written 
because several studies provided evidence 
for the claim that a hard to read font triggers 
more elaborate reasoning processes (Alter 
& Oppenheimer, 2008; Alter, Oppenheimer, 
Epley & Eyre, 2007). Specifically, participants 
presented with the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (henceforth CRT, Frederick, 2005) in a 
hard to read font, tended to override their 
intuitive default more frequently than par-
ticipants in the regular font condition (Alter 
et al., 2007). The present study sought to 
examine whether this would also apply to 
scalar inferences. Particularly, the different 
theories discussed above vary in their view 
on how the not all interpretation arises. 
Default theories assume that the pragmatic 
interpretation arises automatically, whereas 
two-step models hypothesize that the logical 
interpretation is the default. If a hard to read 
font indeed prompts a cancellation of the 
default, two-step models would predict more 
pragmatic interpretations, where default 
theories would expect less pragmatic inter-
pretations. It is less obvious what constraint-
based one-step models would predict in this 
situation. The interpretation of the scalar 
term in this framework is argued to depend 
on cues in the linguistic and discourse con-
text (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014). It is highly 
questionable whether font would actually fit 
this definition of a cue and even if it does, it 
is not clear what effect it would have on the 
interpretation of the scalar term. If anything, 
the one-step model would expect the font 
manipulation to have no effect because it 
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(presumably) does not influence the linguis-
tic and discourse context.
In Experiment 1, we tested these predic-
tions by assigning participants either to a 
normal font or a hard to read font condition. 
The question was whether participants in the 
latter condition were more, less, or equally 
likely to understand the underinformative 
sentences pragmatically. To examine the 
relationship between response time and font 
on the one hand and class membership on 
the other hand, we used an extension of the 
basic latent class analysis. Latent class regres-
sion allows one to add covariates to predict 
the probability of latent class membership 
(Dayton & Macready, 1988). So the question 
is whether response time and font are related 
to the interpretation mode of participants. In 
sum, the Experiment 1 aimed to a) uncover 
systematic interindividual differences in 
interpretation of scalar implicatures and b) 
relate these differences to two predictors, 




Participants were 139 first-year psychology 
students of the University of Leuven (24 
men, 115 women, mean age 18 years), who 
participated in return for course credit. All 
participants were native Dutch speakers. 
Materials
The stimulus material consisted of 20 under-
informative sentences like ‘Some oaks are 
trees’ (i.e., ‘Sommige eiken zijn bomen’ in 
Dutch) and 20 control sentences taken from 
De Neys and Schaeken (2007). Participants 
were required to assess the truth value 
of each sentence. Control sentences were 
always unambiguously true (e.g., ‘Some 
insects are wasps’; ‘Sommige insecten zijn 
wespen’ in Dutch) or false (e.g., ‘Some beetles 
are flowers’; ‘Sommige kevers zijn bloemen’ in 
Dutch). The font in which these sentences 
were presented, obtained from Alter and 
Oppenheimer (2008), was either 16 point 
Times New Roman (i.e., the normal condition) 
or 16 point italicized Haettenschweiler (i.e., 
the hard to read condition). All materials 
were in Dutch.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the 
normal or hard to read font condition1. The 
order of the 40 sentences was also random 
and varied over participants. Each sentence 
was presented in the center of a computer 
screen and participants indicated whether it 
was true or false by pressing “w” or “n” on an 
AZERTY keyboard. The sentence remained on 
the screen until a response was made. Four 
different control practice trials preceded 
the main experiment. The study has been 
approved by the medical ethics committee of 
the University of Leuven (reference number: 
ML8930).
Results
The responses of participants to the 20 
underinformative sentences were used as 
input to the latent class analysis. Participants 
with less than 75% of the control trials cor-
rect were removed from the analyses (N = 
9). A model selection approach was taken to 
estimate the number of latent classes. That is 
to say, the fit of five latent class models, rep-
resenting a one, two, three, four, or five class 
solution, was compared. This was accom-
plished via the poLCA R package (Linzer & 
Lewis, 2011). We ran each model 50 times to 
avoid local maxima. Model fit was assessed 
with the Bayesian Information Criterion or 
BIC-score. It compares the goodness of fit 
to the number of parameters of the model. 
Models with lower BIC-sores are preferable. 
The BIC-scores for the five models indicate 
that the three class model provides the best 
fit of the data (see Table 1).
To give a substantive interpretation of the 
three classes (preliminary denoted as class A, 
B and C), we looked at the class-conditional 
response probabilities. These estimate the 
probability of interpreting a certain under-
informative sentence pragmatically (or logi-
cally) given class membership: when someone 
is a member of class A, what is then the 
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probability to interpret ‘Some oaks are trees’ 
pragmatically. The class-conditional probabil-
ities were rather stable over items meaning 
that a member of, say, class A has a more or 
less equal probability to interpret ‘Some oaks 
are trees’ pragmatically as to interpret ‘Some 
ants are insects’ pragmatically. So based on 
these probabilities one can distil the mean-
ing of the three classes. The average probabil-
ity of a pragmatic interpretation for Class A, 
B and C was 0.94, 0.05 and 0.64. Hence, they 
were conceived, respectively, as a pragmatic 
class, a logical class and an inconsistent class. 
Thus, these findings suggest that there are 
three groups of participants corresponding 
to three interpretation modes: logical, prag-
matic and inconsistent. As we already men-
tioned in the introduction, some uncertainty 
exists in the classification of participants into 
these groups. Nevertheless, one can predict 
class membership by modal assignment (i.e., 
assigning participants to their most probable 
class). This approach makes it possible to esti-
mate the number of participants per class. It 
shows that the majority of the participants 
are consistent in their interpretation, 45% 
are pragmatic and 34% are logical, whereas 
21% are inconsistent.
To test whether these interindividual 
differences can be explained by font and 
response time, we ran a latent class regres-
sion analysis which allows to add covariates 
to predict latent class membership. The three 
covariates here were Font, a dichotomous 
variable, Response Time Underinformative 
(RTU), which was the z-transformed median 
response time per participant over all under-
informative items (M = 2022 ms, SD = 
511) and Response Time Control (RTC), the 
z-transformed median response time per par-
ticipant over all control items (M = 2092 ms, 
SD = 461). To assess the predictive value of 
these variables, we again opted for a model 
comparison approach (see Table 2). 
The preferred model according to the 
BIC-scores was the one with Response Time 
Underinformative as the only covariate. The 
models that included Font and/or Response 
Time Control yielded higher BIC-scores, which 
indicates that these variables were not sig-
nificantly related to class membership. Taken 
together, we can predict the probability of 
latent class membership from the response 
times of participants to the underinforma-
tive sentences, but not on the basis of their 
response times to the control sentences nor 
on the font in which these sentences were 
presented. Specifically, the probability of 
belonging to the logical group relative to the 
pragmatic group increases when Response 
Time Underinformative decreases (t(66) = 
3.47, p < .001). Similarly, the probability of 
Models BIC
One class model 3627
Two class model 2109
Three class model 2057
Four class model 2112
Five class model 2174
Note. The best fitting model is printed in 
bold.
Table 1: BIC-scores for the five latent class 
models. Models only differ in the number 
of latent classes they presume.
Models BIC




Font + RTU 2046
Font + RTC 2063
RTU + RTC 2044
Font + RTU + RTC 2050
Note. The best fitting model is printed in 
bold.
Table 2: BIC-scores for the eight latent class 
regression models. Models presume three 
latent classes and differ only in the covari-
ates that are included.
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belonging to the logical group relative to 
the inconsistent group also increases when 
Response Time Underinformative decreases 
(t(66) = 2.26, p = .03). There was no signifi-
cant difference between the pragmatic class 
and the inconsistent class (t(66) = 0.44, p = 
.69). In other words, the faster a participant 
is, the higher the probability of interpreting 
underinformative sentences logically than 
pragmatically or inconsistently (see Figure 
1). Importantly, this effect is not driven by 
reading speed in general since response 
times to the control sentences were unre-
lated to class membership.
Discussion
Experiment 1 documents interindividual dif-
ferences in the derivation of scalar inferences. 
Using a latent class analysis, it shows that 
there are three groups of people: those who 
consistently endorse a pragmatic interpreta-
tion (i.e., some means not all), those who con-
sistently adopt a logical interpretation (i.e., 
some means some and possibly all) and those 
who are rather inconsistent. Furthermore, 
people’s class membership can be predicted 
by their response time to the underinforma-
tive sentences. Specifically, participants were 
more likely to be inconsistent or consistent 
pragmatic interpreters when their responses 
to underinformative sentences were relatively 
delayed, whereas participants who responded 
relatively fast to underinformative sentences 
were more likely to endorse a logical interpre-
tation. These results conceptually replicate 
and extend the finding of Bott and colleagues 
(2004; 2012) that pragmatic interpretations 
require more time than logical interpreta-
tions. An alternative explanation of the 
relation between response time to underin-
formative sentences and interpretation mode 
is that some participants merely ignored the 
quantifier and evaluated the truth value of the 
embedded proposition (e.g., oaks are trees). 
Indeed, sentences were presented as a whole 
rather than word per word, which might fos-
ter such a strategy. Neglecting the quanti-
fier would arguably lead to shorter response 
times and would elicit “yes” responses to 
underinformative sentences (e.g., oaks are in 
fact trees). However, the former would also 
hold for control sentences. That is, ignoring 
the quantifier would decrease response times 
in general. If this explanation were to be true, 
one would also expect a relation between 
response times to control sentences and 
the interpretation of underinformative sen-
tences. The results revealed that this was not 
the case, which implies that interpretation 
mode is not linked to a general slowing of 
response speed. In addition, several (control) 
experiments have been carried out, using 
paradigms where sentences are presented 
word by word, which attributed the slowing 
observed for pragmatic interpretations to 
the computation of the scalar inference itself 
(Bott et al., 2012). 
Besides response time we also examined 
the effect of font on class membership. 
Figure 1: The probability of latent class 
membership for different response times. 
The x-axis represents the standardized 
median response times to the underin-
formative sentences. The y-axis denotes 
the predicted probability of latent class 
membership.
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Because a hard to read font has been shown 
to reduce reliance on defaults (Alter et al., 
2007), we suspected that it might also have 
an influence on the interpretation of under-
informative sentences. Specifically, default 
theories would expect more logical interpre-
tations in the hard to read font condition, 
whereas two-step models would predict the 
opposite. However, the results showed no 
effect of font (i.e., 60% pragmatic responses 
in the hard font versus 57% in the normal 
font condition). This finding is more in line 
with the constraint-based one-step model of 
Degen and Tanenhaus (2014), which postu-
lates that cues in the linguistic and discourse 
context determine the interpretation of the 
scalar term. Font size is definitely not a lin-
guistic cue and is arguably not part of the 
discourse context. Hence, this model could 
account for the fact that font has no influ-
ence on the interpretation of underinforma-
tive sentences. 
One alternative explanation for the lack of 
an effect may be that the manipulation failed 
or was not strong enough. Even though 
the same fonts were used as in Alter and 
Oppenheimer (2008), the hard to read font 
may have failed to trigger more elaborate rea-
soning processes. The data seem to support 
this hypothesis as participants in the hard 
to read font condition were not significantly 
slower than those in the normal font condi-
tion (t(128) = 1.24, p = .22)2. This result casts 
some doubt on the robustness of perceptual 
fluency manipulations. Moreover, it may 
even nuance the pervasiveness of the per-
ceptual fluency effect per se: there is perhaps 
no such effect in sentence verification. The 
latter assertion appears to contradict with 
the results from Reber and Schwarz (1999), 
who reported that perceptual fluency affects 
truth judgments of statements like ‘Osorno 
is in Chile’. However, closer inspection of 
their results, using the Bayesian hypothesis 
test developed by Rouder et al. (2009), indi-
cates that the null hypothesis (i.e., no differ-
ence between highly and moderately visible 
conditions) is actually about 5 times more 
likely than the alternative. Furthermore, 
Thompson and colleagues (2013) recently 
examined the effect of perceptual fluency on 
accuracy in a variety of cognitive tasks. They 
found no evidence that disfluency increases 
accuracy except in the CRT, where only the 
most cognitive able showed the effect. 
In sum, the latent class analysis employed 
in Experiment 1 showed large interindividual 
differences in the interpretation of a scalar 
term like some. In a second experiment we 
sought to explain this variability by linking 
interpretation mode to a range of cognitive 
and personality traits. The included covari-
ates from the cognitive domain were working 
memory capacity and the ability to override 
an intuitive default. As noted by De Neys and 
Schaeken (2007), the nature of the relation 
between working memory and the under-
standing of underinformative sentences has 
repercussions for the theories about scalar 
inferences. If an enriched interpretation 
requires cognitive resources as suggested by 
relevance theory and two-step models3, one 
might expect people with limited working 
memory capacity to endorse the pragmatic 
reading of some to a lesser extent (Dieussaert 
et al., 2011). However, results from previous 
studies are equivocal. Dieussaert and col-
leagues did not find a link between working 
memory span and the number of pragmatic 
responses, whereas Feeney, Scrafton, 
Duckworth and Handley (2004) obtained a 
negative correlation. One goal of Experiment 
2 was to provide more insight on this issue. 
A similar argument can be made for 
people’s ability to override a default. It is 
conceivable that people who rely heavily 
on heuristics may rarely move to a more 
elaborate understanding of a scalar term. 
In contrast, those who are able to inhibit 
their sometimes incorrect, gut feeling may 
also endorse a more cognitively demand-
ing interpretation. The predictions are very 
similar to these for the font manipulation in 
Experiment 1. If the literal meaning of some 
is default (as assumed by two-step models) 
on might expect heuristic thinkers to more 
readily adopt a logical interpretation mode, 
whereas a default theory might expect the 
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reverse. Again, it is not clear what one-step 
models would predict as they reject the 
notion of a default interpretation. 
Besides the two cognitive variables 
described above, we also included ten per-
sonality covariates, which can be divided into 
two groups of five. One group consists of the 
subscales of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
questionnaire: Social skill, Communication, 
Imagination, Attention to detail, and 
Attention switching (Baron-Cohen, Wheel-
wright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). 
The others are the so-called Big Five person-
ality traits: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Cons
cientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to 
Experience (McCrae & John, 1992). The latter 
were included for exploratory purposes only. 
The former, however, were used to elaborate 
on findings from Nieuwland, Ditman, and 
Kuperberg (2010), who found that prag-
matically skilled people (i.e., those with a low 
score on the Communication subscale) were 
more sensitive to underinformative state-
ments. That is, Nieuwland and colleagues 
found a relation between N400, an ERP com-
ponent associated with semantic processing, 
and people’s communicative abilities. This 
was interpreted as to mean that communi-
catively skilled people are more responsive 
to pragmatic violations as indexed by the 
N400 component. Experiment 2 examined 
whether these findings generalize to sen-




Participants were 322 first-year psychology 
students of the University of Leuven (57 
men, 262 women, mean age 18 years), who 
participated in return for course credit. All 
participants were native Dutch speakers.
Materials
Working memory capacity was assessed 
using a Dutch, computerized, and group 
administrable adaptation of the Operation 
Span Test (henceforth GOSPAN, De Neys, 
d’Ydewalle, Schaeken, & Vos, 2002). In this 
test, participants have to judge the validity of 
a simple equation (e.g., is 4/2 – 1 = 5?) after 
which a to-be-remembered word is briefly 
presented. After two to six of such equation-
word sequences, participants are prompted 
to write down the words in the correct order. 
Participants’ working memory scores tally 
the number of correctly remembered words, 
but only of the completely reproduced word 
series (so partially correct word series do not 
count towards the score). There are 15 series 
in total, which can maximally lead to a score 
of 60.
The ability to override an intuitive default 
was measured by the three-item CRT 
(Frederick, 2005). It comprises three open 
ended short questions such as If it takes 5 
machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how 
long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets? The intuitive answer to these ques-
tions (i.e., 100 for the example item) always 
differs from the correct answer (i.e., 5 for the 
example item). Participants’ score on the 
CRT is simply the number of correctly solved 
questions. 
The Big Five dimensions (i.e., Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroti-
cism, and Openness) were measured with 
the Dutch version of the Ten Item Personality 
Inventory (henceforth TIPI, Hofmans, 
Kuppens, & Allik, 2008). Participants had to 
indicate on a seven-point scale the extent 
to which ten pairs of traits like extraverted, 
enthusiastic applied to them. There is one 
pair for every pole of the Big Five dimensions 
and participants get a score per dimension 
by averaging over the two relevant items 
(after reverse scoring where appropriate). 
The Dutch Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
questionnaire was also administered 
(henceforth AQ, Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & 
Boomsma, 2008). It consists of fifty state-
ments and participants have to rate on a 
four-point scale to what extent they agree 
or disagree with each statement. The AQ 
questionnaire consists of five subscales (i.e., 
Social skill, Communication, Imagination, 
Attention to detail, and Attention switch-
ing) each comprising ten statements. 
Heyman and Schaeken: Some Differences in Some 9
Summing across the ten statements (again 
after reverse scoring when appropriate) 
yields a score on every subscale. The higher 
the score, the more autistic traits one pos-
sesses. Hence, people with a low score on 
the Communication scale, with items such 
as I find it easy to “read between the lines”, are 
more communicatively skilled.
Finally, the sentence verification task was 
the same as in Experiment 1, except that 
the items were always presented in a nor-
mal font. 
Procedure
Participants completed the tasks in the fol-
lowing order: CRT, TIPI, AQ, sentence verifica-
tion, and GOSPAN. All tasks were performed 
on a computer, except that the word series 
of the GOSPAN had to be written down on 
an answer sheet. The procedure of the sen-
tence verification task was the same as in 
Experiment 1.
Results
Participants who did not complete all tasks 
or whose accuracy on the control trials of 
the sentence verification task was below 
75% were removed from the analyses (N = 
20). The results of the latent class analysis 
replicated those of Experiment 1 in that the 
three class solution provided the best fit of 
the data (see Table 3). The classes can again 
be interpreted in terms of three interpreta-
tion modes: logical (18% of the participants), 
pragmatic (71%), and inconsistent (12%). 
Note that the pragmatic class appears to be 
larger than in Experiment 1, even though the 
same stimulus material was used. So even 
when variables such as proportion of fill-
ers and language, which have been argued 
to influence the number of (consistent) 
pragmatic interpretations (Dieussaert et al., 
2011), are held constant, there can be vari-
ability in the respective size of each latent 
class over experiments.
In a next step, a series of latent class 
regression analyses were performed. First, 
all models with a single main effect were fit-
ted (see Table 4). The results indicate that 
neither the cognitive nor the personality 
covariates are able to predict class mem-
bership. Except for the model with CRT, 
which fits the data as well as the empty 
model (both BIC’s = 4401), all other models 
perform worse (all BIC’s ≥ 4407). A follow-
up analysis examining the CRT model sug-
gested that the higher people score on the 
CRT, the higher the probability of adopting 
a logical interpretation mode compared to 
an inconsistent interpretation mode (t(238) 
= 1.67, p = .10). Similarly, the probability of 
belonging to the pragmatic class relative to 
the inconsistent class also seems to increase 
as CRT-score increases (t(238) = 1.64, p = 
.10). However, there was no such effect for 
the logical versus the pragmatic class (t(238) 
= 0.44, p = .66). These findings may suggest 
that people with a high CRT-score are more 
persistent in their interpretation of scalar 
terms. Alternatively, some participants may 
have been more motivated to perform well 
on the various tasks, which caused them to 
obtain higher CRT-scores and adopt a con-
sistent interpretation mode. Note though, 
that the results were only significant at a 
trend level, so one should be especially cau-
tious when interpreting these findings.
Besides the twelve cognitive and personal-
ity covariates, we again also looked at partici-
pants’ response times. The results replicated 
those of Experiment 1 in that response times 
to the control sentences were unrelated to 
class membership, while response times to 
Models BIC
One class model 7188
Two class model 4536
Three class model 4401
Four class model 4431
Five class model 4503
Note. The best fitting model is printed in 
bold.
Table 3: BIC-scores for the five latent class 
models. Models only differ in the number 
of latent classes they presume.
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the underinformative sentences did predict 
membership. Specifically, the probability of 
belonging to the logical class relative to the 
pragmatic group increases when Response 
Time Underinformative decreases (t(238) = 
2.69, p < .01). Likewise, the probability of 
belonging to the logical group relative to 
the inconsistent group also increases when 
Response Time Underinformative decreases, 
but this result is only significant at a trend 
level (t(238) = 1.77, p = .08). There was again 
no significant difference between the prag-
matic class and the inconsistent class (t(238) 
= 0.48, p = .63). These findings are in line 
with those of Experiment 1. They suggest 
that the slower participants respond to 
underinformative sentences, the more likely 
they are to interpret them consistently prag-
matic or inconsistent instead of consistently 
logical (see Figure 2). 
In addition to the 14 models that com-
prised only a single main effect, we also fit-
ted more complex models. Specifically, we 
evaluated all models that can be formed by 
combining the 14 main effects. The results 
showed that neither model provided a bet-
ter fit than the baseline model, expect for 
the RTU single main effect model discussed 
above. 
Discussion
The present experiment sought to examine 
whether cognitive characteristics (i.e., work-
ing memory capacity and the ability to over-
ride an intuitive default) and personality 
Models BIC















Note. The best fitting model is printed in 
bold.
Table 4: BIC-scores for the 15 latent class 
regression models. Models presume three 
latent classes and differ only in the covari-
ates that are included.
Figure 2: The probability of latent class 
membership for different response times. 
The x-axis represents the standardized 
median response times to the underin-
formative sentences. The y-axis denotes 
the predicted probability of latent class 
membership.
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traits (i.e., the Big Five dimensions and the 
subscales of the Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
questionnaire) are related people’s inter-
pretation of scalar terms. To this end, a 
latent class analysis was conducted, which 
a) showed again that there are three inter-
pretation modes (i.e., logical, pragmatic and 
inconsistent) and b) revealed that neither the 
cognitive nor the personality covariates were 
predictive for class membership. However, 
participants’ response times to the underin-
formative sentences did relate to interpreta-
tion mode, thereby replicating the findings 
from Experiment 1. That is, the faster partici-
pants responded to such sentences, the more 
likely they were to consistently endorse a log-
ical interpretation instead of an inconsistent 
or a consistent pragmatic interpretation. 
The fact that none of the included varia-
bles, except response times to underinform-
ative sentences, could (partly) explain the 
interindividual variability in interpretation 
mode was somewhat surprising. Recall that 
three of the covariates were included to test 
specific hypotheses derived from the litera-
ture (i.e., working memory capacity, the abil-
ity to override a default, and communicative 
skills), while the others were merely added 
for exploratory purposes. Hence, in what fol-
lows, we will focus on the former variables 
and discuss the theoretical implications of 
the present findings.
To reiterate, there are different views on 
how people arrive at the pragmatic not all 
interpretation of some. Default theories 
assume that this enrichment occurs auto-
matically, whereas relevance theory and two-
step models posit that it requires cognitive 
resources. Based on the latter proposition 
one could predict that people with lim-
ited working memory capacity endorse the 
effortful pragmatic reading to a lesser extent 
because they lack the necessary resources. 
However, such a claim is not supported 
by the data as working memory capacity 
was not related to interpretation mode. 
This is in line with results of Dieussaert et 
al., (2011), who found no effect of working 
memory capacity on the number of prag-
matic responses, but it contrasts with the 
negative correlation reported by Feeney 
and colleagues (2004). At first glance these 
findings seem incompatible with the notion 
that a pragmatic understanding is cogni-
tively demanding. On the other hand, one 
could argue that the cognitive cost involved 
in a pragmatic interpretation is relatively 
low such that even individuals with limited 
working memory capacity routinely move 
to an enriched interpretation. There is some 
evidence in support of the latter assump-
tion. De Neys and Schaeken (2007) found 
that a logical reading becomes more preva-
lent when participants have to remember a 
complex dot pattern, which indicates that 
a pragmatic interpretation is not automatic 
(see also Marty & Chemla, 2013). Critically, 
Dieussaert and colleagues showed that this 
logical shift under high load is only true for 
people with low working memory scores. In 
other words, limited working memory capac-
ity in itself does not lead to fewer pragmatic 
interpretations unless an additional cogni-
tive load is imposed. 
A similar hypothesis was advanced regard-
ing people’s ability to overcome a default 
(measured by the CRT). That is, those who 
are able to refute the (erroneous) intui-
tive answer to a math puzzle, may also be 
more inclined to move to a more cogni-
tively demanding interpretation of a scalar 
term. However, the results did not show a 
pragmatic to logical shift, or vice versa. If 
anything, the results suggested that partici-
pants tended to be more consistent in their 
interpretation when they scored high on the 
CRT. It seems that people who are less prone 
to use heuristics are more likely to be persis-
tent in their interpretation of underinforma-
tive sentences.
Finally, based on findings from Nieuwland 
et al. (2010) it was predicted that communi-
catively skilled individuals would be more 
likely to adopt a pragmatic interpretation 
mode. Yet, the present results did not find 
a relation between interpretation mode and 
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scores on the Communication subscale of the 
AQ questionnaire. The behavioral data of this 
experiment thus do not converge with the 
neurological pattern observed by Nieuwland 
and colleagues. However, the results concur 
with behavioral studies comparing people 
with autism spectrum disorders to high-
functioning controls (Chevallier, Wilson, 
Happé, & Noveck, 2010; Pijnacker, Hagoort, 
Buitelaar, Teunisse, & Geurts, 2009). It is not 
uncommon though that behavioral markers 
yield different results than N400 data (Kutas 
& Federmeier, 2011). Indeed, it is precisely 
the strength of ERP’s to provide insight into 
aspects of cognition that are impenetrable 
with behavioral measures. Taken together, 
the findings thus far seem to indicate that 
communicatively skilled people exhibit a dif-
ferent neurological response to pragmatic 
violations, but that this does not necessarily 
result in more pragmatic interpretations of 
underinformative sentences.
General discussion 
The present article examined people’s 
understanding of scalar terms using latent 
class analysis. It demonstrated that one can 
adopt three different interpretation modes 
when confronted with underinformative 
sentences such as ‘Some oaks are trees’. That 
is, people either consistently endorse the 
pragmatic not all interpretation, or they con-
sistently hold the logical some and possibly 
all interpretation, or they change their inter-
pretation over sentences. Furthermore, we 
examined whether this interindividual varia-
bility could be explained by text characteris-
tics (i.e., font size, which was manipulated in 
Experiment 1), response times (Experiment 
1 and 2), personality traits (i.e., the Big Five 
dimensions and the subscales of the AQ 
questionnaire, Experiment 2), and cognitive 
abilities (i.e., working memory capacity and 
the ability to override an intuitive default, 
Experiment 2). The results showed that only 
response times to underinformative sen-
tences were reliably related class member-
ship. The remainder of the discussion will 
first elaborate on the role of response times 
and then address why the other variables 
were not predictive for class membership.
Across two experiments, it was shown that 
the faster people respond, the more likely 
they are to interpret some consistently logi-
cal as opposed to consistently pragmatic or 
inconsistent. The latter should not be taken 
as a causal statement (i.e., “being a slow 
reader/responder causes one to adopt a 
pragmatic interpretation”). For one because 
response times to control sentences were not 
predictive for class membership. Secondly, 
response times to underinformative sen-
tences can be considered as a proxy for the 
cognitive costs involved to endorse a cer-
tain interpretation. This would reverse the 
causality (i.e., a pragmatic reading of some 
causes one to be a slow responder, presum-
ably because the derivation is effortful). The 
latter explanation, which has been advanced 
by Bott and Noveck (2004), is incompatible 
with default theories as they consider the 
pragmatic interpretation to be automatic 
and effortless. 
The finding that a pragmatic interpre-
tation of an underinformative sentence 
requires more time has been replicated 
in several studies (e.g., Bott et al., 2012; 
Tomlinson et al., 2013). Several theories have 
been proposed to account for this effect (i.a., 
relevance theory, constraint-based one-step 
models, two-step models, the grammatical 
account,…), but two critical questions still 
remained unanswered: (a) how general is 
this effect and (b) does the additional pro-
cessing time associated with a pragmatic 
reading of underinformative sentences actu-
ally imply that the scalar inference itself is 
costly? We will consider both these issues 
starting with (b).
According to Bott and colleagues (2012), 
the delayed pragmatic interpretation of 
an underinformative sentence is at least 
partly the result of a cognitively demand-
ing derivation process. This assertion is 
supported by a recent study by Tomlinson 
and colleagues (2013), which used a cursor 
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movement tracking technique. Specifically, 
participants performed a sentence veri-
fication task by clicking on one of two 
response boxes labelled “true” and “false”. 
The response boxes were presented in oppo-
site corners at the top of the screen and the 
cursor was initially located at the bottom 
center of the screen. Participants respond-
ing “false” to underinformative sentences 
first tended to drift towards the “true” box 
before eventually converging on the “false” 
button, whereas participants responding 
“true” more or less followed a straight line. 
Nevertheless, the assumption that the scalar 
inference itself is cognitively costly has been 
challenged by Marty and Chemla (2013). 
These authors argued that the decision to 
enrich the interpretation of the scalar term 
requires cognitive resources rather than the 
derivation per se. 
The second debated issue concerns the 
generality of the effect. That is, several stud-
ies, using other paradigms than the verifica-
tion of underinformative sentences, raised 
questions as to whether scalar inferences are 
in general cognitively costly. Breheny, Katsos, 
and Williams (2006) reported that par-
ticipants in a self-paced reading task spend 
more time processing fragments that con-
tained a scalar term when the context invited 
an enriched interpretation (e.g., “Mary asked 
John whether he intended to host all his rela-
tives in his tiny apartment. John replied that 
he intended to host some of his relatives.”). 
However, a recent carefully controlled study 
by Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino (2013) did 
not replicate this effect. Furthermore, two 
studies using the visual world eye-tracking 
paradigm provided mixed evidence regarding 
the time course of scalar inferences. Where 
Grodner, Klein, Carbary, and Tanenhaus 
(2010) report that it is computed immedi-
ately, Huang and Snedeker (2009) found a 
short delay in the computation of the scalar 
inference. Note also that pragmatic deriva-
tions other than scalar inferences are not 
associated with slower reading times. That 
is, people understand idioms like “the cat is 
out of the bag” or sarcasm as fast as literal 
utterances (Gibbs, 1986; Ortony, Schallert, 
Reynolds, & Antos, 1978). Taken together, 
even though sentence verification data in this 
and other studies (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Bott 
et al., 2012; Tomlinson et al., 2013) clearly 
demonstrate that pragmatic interpretations 
of underinformative sentences are slower, it 
does not entail that scalar inferences are in 
general cognitively costly. 
Besides response time to underinfomative 
sentences no other variable was related to 
class membership. Nevertheless, these null 
results have some theoretical and meth-
odological implications. First of all, the font 
wherein the sentences were presented was 
manipulated in Experiment 1 because hard 
to read fonts are argued to trigger more 
elaborate processing, which should reduce 
the reliance on defaults (Alter et al., 2007). 
As explained in the introduction, there are 
different views on how scalar inferences 
arise. More specifically, some theories argue 
that a scalar term elicits a default interpre-
tation, which can be cancelled or enriched 
(i.e., default theories and two-step models). 
Hence, these theories might predict that a 
font manipulation would influence partici-
pants’ interpretation of underinformative 
sentences, which was not the case. At first 
glance, one could interpret this as evidence 
for non-default theories (i.e., relevance the-
ory, constraint-based one-step models), yet 
there are two caveats. For one, Alter and col-
leagues used the font manipulation to exam-
ine high-order cognitive processes involved 
in syllogistic reasoning and solving math 
problems. It is entirely possible that these 
effects do not translate to interpretations of 
scalar terms. Our failure to obtain an effect 
of font on participants’ response times and 
the reanalysis of the data from Reber and 
Schwarz (1999) cast some doubt on the gen-
eralizability of the perceptual fluency effect. 
The latter study also manipulated sentence 
visibility by changing the font and examined 
the effect on truth value judgments. More 
specifically, they looked at evaluations of 
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sentences like ‘Osorno is in Chile’, which did 
not contain scalar terms. Reber and Schwarz 
reported that highly visible statements were 
more likely to be judged as true in compari-
son to moderately visible statements. Yet the 
statistical evidence was weak and a Bayesian 
reanalysis of their results actually supported 
the null hypothesis (i.e., no effect of sen-
tence visibility). For these reasons, we do not 
believe that the null effect of font observed 
in our study provides strong evidence for 
non-default models.
Secondly, neither working memory capac-
ity nor people’s ability to override a default 
predicted class membership. Taken together, 
these findings seem to indicate that the cog-
nitive costs involved in a pragmatic inter-
pretation (predicted by contextual accounts 
and two-step models) or in cancelling a prag-
matic reading and moving to a logical inter-
pretation (predicted by default accounts) 
are limited. This explanation is intuitively 
compelling as it would be unfeasible to fre-
quently draw a cognitively demanding infer-
ence. It is especially true from a contextualist 
point of view as a pragmatic understanding 
of some is so pervasive that a burdensome 
derivation would be unparsimonious. The 
finding that cognitive skills were not pre-
dictive for class membership corroborates 
conclusions from developmental studies. For 
instance, Antoniou, Grohmann, Kambanaros, 
and Katsos (2013) report that 6-to 12-year 
old children’s ability to comprehend impli-
catures was unrelated to a range of cogni-
tive factors. These findings suggest that the 
interpretation of scalar terms throughout 
the lifespan is unrelated to working memory 
capacity and other cognitive skills. Instead, it 
has been suggested that linguistic skills play 
a major role in the development of prag-
matic competence (Katsos, Andrés Roqueta, 
Estevan, & Cummins, 2011). This assertion is 
supported by the observation that children 
with Specific Language Impairment, which 
manifests itself as a delay in the develop-
ment of receptive and/or expressive lan-
guage, have an impaired understanding of 
scalar terms (Katsos et al., 2011). Yet, the 
present study found no link between a num-
ber of personality covariates, including com-
municative ability, and interpretation mode. 
Although communicative ability is arguably 
only one facet of linguistic skill, previous 
work from Nieuwland and colleagues (2010) 
did show a relation between communicative 
ability, measured by the Communication sub-
scale of the AQ questionnaire, and neurologi-
cal responses to underinformative sentences. 
This finding supports the idea that prag-
matically skilled people are more sensitive to 
underinformative utterances. However, the 
present failure to replicate this finding on a 
behavioral level might indicate that sentence 
verification data are not ideal to detect such 
subtle effects (see also Chevallier et al., 2010; 
Pijnacker et al., 2009) or that our sample was 
too homogeneous in terms of communica-
tive ability. 
Taken together, the present article sought 
to uncover systematic interindividual differ-
ences in people’s understanding of scalar 
terms. The literature on scalar inferences 
has mostly focused on the underlying pro-
cesses, thereby generally ignoring inter-
individual differences. Specifically, many 
studies have investigated whether a certain 
manipulation elicits more pragmatic (or 
logical) interpretations, while the main goal 
of this research was to provide more insight 
as to why people vary in their interpretation 
of scalar terms. To this end, we used latent 
class regression, which is a viable alternative 
to analyze data from a typical scalar impli-
cature experiment. The conventional data 
analysis involves calculating the percentage 
pragmatic answers for every participant over 
all (underinformative) items and examining 
whether the manipulation has an effect 
on these percentages. A peculiarity here 
is that the data form a U-shaped distribu-
tion. The reason is that a participant often 
interprets (almost) all underinformative 
sentences pragmatically or logically, result-
ing in, respectively, an extremely high per-
centage pragmatic answers or an extremely 
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low percentage. Since these data severely 
violate the normality assumption, several 
traditional statistical tests like ANOVA and 
the Student’s t-test are ineligible. Latent 
class regression analysis circumvents this 
issue and it also allows us to add covariates 
to predict class membership. 
In sum, the results of this study showed 
that the response time to underinformative 
sentences was a reliable predictor for class 
membership, but no other variables (i.e., 
working memory capacity, non-linguistic 
cognitive skills, and personality traits) were 
related to participants’ interpretation. As to 
why people differ in their understanding of 
scalar terms thus remains an open question. 
However, the present research provides a 
starting point for future research as it elimi-
nates some explanations by using a sound 
statistical framework. 
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Notes
 1 Due to an inattention, the number of 
participants in both conditions was not 
perfectly balanced. There were 90 partici-
pants in the normal font condition and 
49 in the hard to read font condition. 
 2 A Bayesian two sample t-test (Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey & Iverson, 2009) 
favors the null hypothesis (i.e., response 
times in both font conditions are equal), 
though the evidence is weak (BF = 3.43, 
with a Cauchy distribution on effect size).
 3 Even though constraint-based one-step 
models can account for findings indicat-
ing that the scalar inference is cogni-
tively costly (e.g., Tomlinson et al., 2013), 
they do not consider this to be a general 
phenomenon. That is, the derivation that 
some means not all can be relatively rapid 
and less demanding in certain situations 
(Degen & Tanenhaus, 2014). 
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